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DONALDSON V. UNITED STATES
TAXPAYER INTERVENTION AT SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
TO ENFORCE AN INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE SUMMONS
Donaldson v. United States1
The Internal Revenue Code of 19542 authorizes the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to compel the production of records and
testimony by means of an administrative summons.' The use of this
summons against third parties who may have records relevant to the
taxpayer's civil or criminal tax liability has, in recent years, produced
a number of suits by taxpayers to prevent the government from
obtaining the desired information.
In Donaldson v. United States,4 the IRS issued summonses to the
taxpayer's former employer, Acme Circus Operating Company, and its
accountant, demanding the production of records pertaining to Donald-
son's employment and commanding an appearance to testify before the
1. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
2. Hereinafter cited in text as the Code.
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 7602(2) provides inter alia:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of
any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability,
the Secretary or his delegate is authorized . . . [t]o summon . . . any person
having possession, custody, or care of books of account . . . to appear before
the Secretary or his delegate . . . and to produce . . . records . . . and to
give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry
4. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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issuing agent. The taxpayer enjoined compliance and moved to inter-
vene at the enforcement proceeding subsequently initiated by the IRS.'
The district court denied the motion to intervene and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.' Before the Supreme Court, Donaldson argued that the IRS
was attempting to use the section 7602 summons improperly to gather
evidence to be used against him in a future criminal prosecution. He
based his right to intervene on the provisions of rule 24(a) (2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' as interpreted in a prior decision
of the Supreme Court.8
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of inter-
vention,' holding that any use of the section 7602 summons is valid if
the summons is issued in good faith prior to a recommendation for
prosecution; and that Donaldson did not have a significantly protect-
able interest in the records sought, such as one arising from ownership
or a legally recognized privilege and, therefore, did not meet the
"interest" requirement of rule 24(a) (2). The Court also held that
the taxpayer was not guaranteed intervention of right under rule
24 (a) (2) because rule 81 (a) (3)10 specifically provides that the district
courts may limit the applicability of the Federal Rules in summary
enforcement proceedings.
The Donaldson opinion is significant for several reasons. First,
it clarified language in a previous opinion by the Supreme Court which
had indicated that the section 7602 summons could not be used for the
purpose of gathering evdence for use in a criminal prosecution. Second,
it settled a controversy among the circuits as to whether taxpayers
may intervene at enforcement proceedings as a matter of right. Third,
it indicated that taxpayers will not be permitted to delay enforcement
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a) are almost identical. Section
7402(b) provides:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United
States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or
production of books, papers, or other data.
6. United States v. Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd sub noir.
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2) provides:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
8. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
9. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
10. See note 22 infra and accompanying text.
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of Internal Revenue summonses without a showing that some signifi-
cantly protectable interest will be affected. Finally, the Court indicated
that if the IRS abuses the courts' process through the unlawful use
of the section 7602 summons, evidence obtained should be excluded at
any subsequent criminal trial.
I. TAXPAYER INTERVENTION AT SECTION 7602
ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
The IRS seldom issues its administrative summons to a taxpayer
under investigation because the taxpayer may assert valid constitutional
objections as to papers in his possession." The IRS does use the
summons quite extensively, however, for the purpose of obtaining the
records and testimony of third parties which pertain to the liability
of the taxpayer. If the third party refuses to comply or if the taxpayer
is able to obtain an injunction against his compliance,'" the IRS must
petition the district court to enforce the summons pursuant to section
7402 of the Code."3 It is at this later enforcement proceeding that
the taxpayer may move to intervene and present the merits of his
position against production of the records.
Taxpayers efforts to intervene at section 7602 enforcement pro-
ceedings began after the decision in Reisman v. Caplin,"4 in which, for
the first time, the Supreme Court confronted the knotty problem of
what procedures should be followed by objecting taxpayers or sum-
moned parties. In that case, the taxpayer's attorney had hired an
accounting firm to assist him in pending criminal and civil tax litigation.
The IRS issued an administrative summons directing the accountants
to produce all the taxpayer's records which were in their possession.
The accountants expressed willingness to comply but the taxpayer's
attorney sought an injunction against enforcement of the summons,
claiming the records sought were protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. The Court held that the merits of the taxpayer's attempt to avoid
11. A source within the IRS has indicated that there is an unwritten IRS
policy that taxpayers under investigation should rarely be summoned by means of
the section 7602 summons. While the Supreme Court long ago rejected the claim
that the summons is violative of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures [First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925), aft'g
295 F. 142 (S.D. Ala. 1924)], a taxpayer can raise fifth amendment objections as
to papers in his possession. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 250 F. Supp. 472 (D.
Nev. 1965).
12. "[E]ither the taxpayer or any affected party might restrain compliance, as
the Commissioner suggests, until compliance is ordered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 450 (1964).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. 375 U.S. 440 (1964), noted in 14 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 99 (1965) ; 17 OKLA.
L. Ray. 425 (1964).
1972]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
production of the records should be argued through intervention in
the enforcement proceedings, not in a proceeding seeking to enjoin
production or through simple refusal to comply with the summons.
Justice Clark stated:
[T]he Government concedes that a witness or any interested party
may attack the summons before the hearing officer. There are
cases among the circuit which hold that both parties summoned
and those affected by a disclosure may appear or intervene before
the District Court and challenge the summons by asserting their
constitutional or other claims .... We agree with that view ...."
Resolving any ambiguity as to whether this view pertained to the
taxpayer under investigation, the Court stated that "in the event the
taxpayer is not a party to the summons . . .he, too, may intervene."' 8
In Donaldson, the taxpayer sought to intervene17 in the enforce-
ment proceeding, relying upon the language contained within rule
15. 375 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). In the period after Reisman, courts relied on
this dictum in determining whether the taxpayer had the right to intervene. The
First, Second and Fifth Circuits concluded that intervention was limited to situations
in which the taxpayer could show a legal privilege or some proprietary interest in
the records sought by the Government. For instance, in United States v. Mercurio,
418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517 (1971), the court of appeals emphasized that no privileged relationship existed
between Donaldson and his former employer and that Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767
(9th Cir. 1956), made it clear that improper use of the summons to secure information
to be used in a criminal action was not a valid objection prior to indictment. The
taxpayer's claim that the Reisman Court had authorized intervention because his
liability was the subject of the investigation was rejected as going "too far" in its
interpretation of the dictum. See also O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.
1966) ; In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965). On
the other hand, the Reisman language was read by the Third, Sixth and Seventh
Circuits as conferring upon the taxpayer intervention of right. Typical of these
decisions was United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1969), in which
the treasurer of three corporations was summoned to testify and produce records
in an investigation of the taxpayer. Benford refused to comply and at the enforce-
ment proceeding the taxpayer sought to intervene. On appeal from an order which
directed compliance and denied the motion to intervene, the Seventh Circuit held
that intervention was a matter of right when the records sought pertained to the
possible tax liability of the applicant, stating: "We interpret [Reisman] as adopting
the judicial policy with respect to I.R.S. inquisitorial summonses that the person
whose tax liability is the subject of the investigation can intervene and challenge
enforcement if he sees fit." Id. at 1194. See also United States v. Monsey, 429 F.2d
1348 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3d Cir.
1969); Justice v. United States, 365 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1966). What occurred, in
short, in the period after Reisman was a divergence of views among the circuits
going to the very root of the intervention issue. It was this conflict which the
Donaldson Court attempted to resolve.
17. The practice of intervention dates to Roman law, in which it was used
extensively. Ecclesiastical courts brought it to England where it became a common
[VOL. XXXII
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24 (a) (2),'8 as well as the dictum contained within the Reisman
opinion, asserting in the language of the rule, " 'an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the [enforcement]
action and [that] he [was] so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest,' and that his interest [was] not adequately represented
by the parties . . . ." He argued that his intervention became a
matter of right when he met the requirements contained within the




The Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, concluding
that a taxpayer's intervention at a summary enforcement proceeding is
only permissive, regardless of whether the motion to intervene is based
on rule 24(a) (2) or on rule 24(b). The Court supported its limita-
tions of taxpayer intervention by citing rule 81 (a) (3),22 which provides
procedure in in rem and admiralty cases. In the United States prior to 1912,
intervention was normally provided for in the rules of local courts or by state
statutes; after that date Equity Rule 37 [quoted in 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE
24.04, at 24X71 (2d ed. 1970)] the progenitor of the present federal rule, governed
intervention in federal equity proceedings. However, between 1912 and 1938 state
rules governed actions at law under the Conformity Act of 1872 [17 Stat 196] and
federal courts frequently avoided the state rules by deeming the intervention motion
an ancillary bill in equity. Admiralty continued to have its own rule. The existence
of this patchwork of rules made the issue of intervention unduly complex. To remedy
this situation, Congress in 1938 promulgated specific intervention standards in rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The original rule was quite restrictive,
however, and to circumvent the rigid requirements, the courts were forced to develop
mechanisms which would allow intervention in cases in which it was deemed
desirable. In response to inconsistent application of the rule in the federal courts,
Congress in 1966 amended rule 24 to liberalize and standardize the requirements
for intervention.
Intervention in any judicial proceeding, including proceedings to enforce
administrative summonses, is accomplished pursuant to rule 24 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which gives the applicant an absolute right to intervene if
certain requirements are satisfied. The applicant must show an interest in the action
into which intervention is sought, that the applicant's interest will be impaired if
he is absent from the proceeding and that the applicant's interest is not adequately
represented by existing parties. For a brief history of intervention see 3B J. MOORE,
supra, ff 24.04 et seq. See also Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under
Federal Rule 24, 57 Ky. L.J. 329 (1969).
18. See note 7 supra.
19. 400 U.S. at 527-28.
20. See, e.g., Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104, 109 (8th Cir. 1960) (Blackmun, J.).
21. "As a result of the 1966 revision," Professor Moore states, "the absolute
right now exists under present Rule 24(a) (2) when the petitioner claims an interest
in the subject of the action." 3B J. MOORE, supra note 17, 24.07(1) at 24-152
(emphasis added).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (3) provides:
These rules apply to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production
of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of
19721
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that the district court may limit the application of any of the rules to
enforcement proceedings by local rule or by an order in a particular
case. The language in Reisman v. Caplin, which indicated that inter-
vention was a proper remedy, was explained as being permissive only;
that is, the district court could, upon a proper showing, permit inter-
vention, but Reisman should not have been taken to mean that courts
had to sustain a motion to intervene by any taxpayer whose liability
was being investigated through the use of a third party summons.23
"Were we to hold otherwise," the Court stated, "we would unwar-
rantedly cast doubt upon and stultify the Service's every investigatory
move." 4 The Court concluded that the district court must balance
opposing equities in deciding motions to intervene by taxpayers under
investigation.
The Court further stressed that Donaldson had no proprietary
interest in the routine business records of Acme Circus or its accountant,
and that even if the IRS had acquired the desired records by other
means, 25 the taxpayer could not have objected to the use of these
records at a subsequent trial. The Court concluded: "This interest
cannot be the kind contemplated by Rule 24(a) (2) when it speaks
in general terms of 'an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action.' What is obviously meant there is
a significantly protectable interest."2 6
The effect of the decision in Donaldson would, therefore, seem
to be that if the district court finds no significantly protectable interest
in the applicant's objections to enforcement, intervention under rule
24(a) (2) will be denied; however, even if the applicant meets the
requirements contained within the rule, the district court can avoid
the applicability of rule 24(a) under the provisions of rule 81 (a) (3)
the United States . . . except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of
the district court or by order of the court in the proceedings.
23. "[T]he Reisman language," the Court stated, "does not guarantee intervention
for the taxpayer. . . . The language recognizes that the District Court, upon the
customary showing, may allow the taxpayer to intervene. Two instances where
intervention is appropriate were specified, namely, where 'the material is sought
for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution'
or where 'it is protected by the attorney-client privilege.' Thus, the Court recognized
that intervention by a taxpayer in an enforcement proceeding might well be allowed
when the circumstances are proper." 400 U.S. at 529-30.
24. 400 U.S. at 531.
25. The Court suggested that the records might have been included in routine
reports made to the Government by Acme or could have been proffered voluntarily,
depriving Donaldson of even the knowledge of the disclosure. Id. at 531.
26. Id. at 531.
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and deny intervention. The result of the Donaldson decision, therefore,
is to eliminate intervention as a matter of right in taxpayer cases.27
The cases following the Donaldson decision have not, however,
been uniform in their interpretation of this conclusion. Some courts
have denied intervention because of a similarity between the facts before
them and the facts in Donaldson." Other courts have interpreted the
decision to mean that intervention by the taxpayer is at the discretion
of the district court.2 9 The decision has been misread completely in
some cases.
30
It is suggested that, in the area of taxpayer intervention, courts
should adopt an approach similar to the one taken to enforce subpoenas
duces tecum issued by other governmental agencies." That is, if the
taxpayer moves to intervene under rule 24(a) (2) or rule 24(b), the
district court should hold a hearing to determine if the facts warrant
the taxpayer's presence at the enforcement proceeding. Facts which
would justify intervention would include ownership of the records
summoned, privilege or abuse of the court's process. While under
rule 81(a) (3), the district court could deny discovery in summary
enforcement proceedings, some courts 2 have properly permitted dis-
covery by either the taxpayer or the summoned party to aid the court
in determining the validity of the summons. This limited application
of the discovery rules should be permitted if the applicant is seeking
27. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been held to be applicable to
the enforcement of Internal Revenue summonses. See, e.g., United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48 (1964); Daly v. United States, 393 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1968); Justice
v. United States, 365 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1966) (disapproved in the Donaldson case).
Contra, United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 425
F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1971).
28. E.g., United States v. Diracles, 439 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1971); United States
v. White, 326 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
29. E.g., United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Lococo, 440 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1971).
30. E.g., SEC v. First Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1971), wherein
the court applied the significantly protectable interest requirement enunciated in
Donaldson to a rule 24(b) intervention case. Rule 24(b) has no interest requirement.
See note 33 infra.
31. See, e.g., FTC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (no abuse of
discretion to deny discovery) ; FTC v. Sherry, 13 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 81a.33, Case 1
(D.C. Cir. 1969); FTC v. Kujawski, 298 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (discovery
should be allowed in summary enforcement proceedings as the only way for the
court to be able to decide whether to enforce the summons) ; FMC v. N.Y. Terminal
Conference, 262 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1967) ;
United States v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 256 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(FTC subpoena duces tecum) ; FMC v. Transoceanic Terminal Corp., 252 F. Supp.
743 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
32. See United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1970). See also United
States v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 583 (D. Vt. 1970); United States v.
Learner, 298 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ill. 1969).
1972]
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to intervene because a valid objection to enforcement has been raised
but the truth of the objection can be ascertained only by acquisition
of facts known only to the Government. The district court under
either rule 24(a) or rule 24(b)33 would have to balance the taxpayer's
position and interest, as set forth in the proposed pleading, against
the summary nature of the enforcement proceeding, and make the
discretionary decision to permit or deny intervention. Only an abuse
of discretion would warrant reversal on appeal.34
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECTION 7602 SUMMONS:
AN ABUSE OF PROCESS
The most frequent objection to enforcement raised by taxpayers
is that the civil summons is to be used for the improper purpose of
gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. United States
v. O'Connor85 was the first case in which an IRS summons was quashed
on this specific ground. 6 In that case, IRS agents tried to compel the
production of papers belonging to the accountant of the taxpayer after
the taxpayer had been indicted for fraud. The accountant objected to
this use of the summons, arguing that the Treasury Department had no
power to subpoena records to aid the Justice Department in preparing
for a criminal prosecution. The court agreed, holding that such use
of an administrative summons would violate the intent of the rigid
federal criminal discovery rules.8 7
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides inter alia:
Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or fact in common .... In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
34. Rule 81(a) (3) expressly makes the Rules applicable to appeals from
enforcement proceedings. See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 17, ff 81.06(2), at 4443, and
Committee Note to Amended (a), cited at 1 81.01(6), at 4413. The district courts
should make clear, however, when intervention is being permitted under rule 24(a)
and when it is being permitted under rule 24(b), since a decision under rule 24(a)
requires an examination of the merits on appeal whereas a decision under rule 24(b)
merely requires a determination as to whether the district court judge abused his
discretion. See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 17, 24.07. The Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1971), stated, however, that
"[ilt is the intervention in such situations, not the technical basis - as of right
or permissive - for permitting it which thwarts and defeats" the Congressional policy
and that policy would be "adversely affected if this 'outsider' were permitted to take
over the controversy significantly."
35. 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
36. Accord, In re Myers, 202 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 provides for discovery and inspection of documents in
criminal proceedings. Rule 16(c) permits limited discovery by the Government.
Internal documents prepared by an attorney or his agent are excluded, as are state-
[VOL. XXXII
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Confronted with a similar fact situation the Ninth Circuit, in
Boren v. Tucker,8  rejected the argument that because the taxpayer's
records might be used in a future criminal prosecution, acquisition by
an administrative subpoena was prohibited. The court recognized that
any Internal Revenue investigation might disclose either criminal or
civil liability 9 and that even if the examiner concluded that there was
a possibility that criminal liability existed there would be no certainty
that criminal prosecution would be commenced. The O'Connor case
was distinguished because, in that case, the taxpayer had already been
indicted and the IRS summons had been issued to aid the Justice De-
partment in preparing its case. This distinction has been applied in
subsequent decisions, rendering the criminal use prohibition applicable
only to situations in which the taxpayer was under either indictment
or prosecution."0 Although this result may leave room for abuse of
the civil process,4" the dual nature of tax investigations, at least in the
early stages, warrants no other practical solution. 42
ments made by the accused, his attorney or agent. The court may permit discovery
of medical reports, books and records as a condition to like discovery on behalf of
the accused. In this context it should be noted that the O'Connor court, while
dealing with a factual situation in which indictment preceded issuance of the
summons, emphasized that Congress did not intend statutory administrative summonses
to be used in criminal investigations. The court stated:
To encourage the use of administrative subpoenas as a device for com-
pulsory disclosure of testimony to be used in presentments of criminal cases
would diminish one of the fundamental guarantees of liberty. Moreover, it
would sanction perversion of a statutory power. The power under § 3614 was
granted for one purpose, and is now sought to be used in a direction entirely
uncontemplated by the lawgivers.
118 F. Supp. at 251.
38. 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956).
39. The court stated that "[w]hile it is true that once a possible criminal
prosecution comes into existence there can be no settlement of tax until that possibility
has been ruled out, yet the existence of the possibility of criminal prosecution does
not necessarily mean that there will be criminal prosecution." Id. at 772.
40. See, e.g., Howfield, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1969);
McGarry v. Riley, 363 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F.
Supp. 968 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 922 (1971). Accord, United States v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 583
(D. Vt. 1970), where IRS agents sought hospital records indicating the names of
patients treated by the taxpayer without indicating whether the investigation was
civil or criminal; the taxpayer's request for discovery was denied on the ground
that the motives of the agents seeking the records were irrelevant See also United
States v. Learner, 298 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ill. 1969). Contra, United States v.
Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Moriarty, 278 F. Supp. 187
(E.D. Wis. 1967); Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
41. See DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969).
42. For instance, in In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1962), the Second Circuit concluded that since the summons was issued ten months
prior to taxpayer's indictment, it would be impossible to hold other than that the
summons was not issued in contemplation of the prosecution.
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In Reisman v. Caplin,43 however, the Supreme Court stated in
dictum4 4 that an administrative summons may be challenged on the
ground "that the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtain-
ing evidence for use in a criminal prosecution."45 Although by citing
Boren v. Tucker the Court was impliedly accepting the distinction be-
tween a potential criminal prosecution and one that was already in
progress, taxpayers frequently relied upon the Reisman language to
support the contention that the information sought in particular cases
could not be acquired with a section 7602 summons if it was for the
purpose of gathering evidence of tax fraud.4" The Donaldson Court
clearly laid to rest the notion that the summons is used improperly if a
criminal prosecution might result.47 The Court interpreted the Reisman
language in light of its citation to Boren and concluded that if the
summons were issued prior to a recommendation for prosecution,48
there could be no valid objection to its use on the ground that evidence
obtained might later be used in a criminal prosecution.49
The Donaldson Court's rejection of the taxpayer's argument re-
garding improper criminal use should not be taken to mean that an
improper use cannot arise before a recommendation for prosecution;
the Court indicated that if the taxpayer or the party summoned could
show a lack of good faith on the part of the investigating agent, abuse
of process would be a valid objection to enforcement of the summons.°
43. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
44. In holding that equity was without jurisdiction, the Court made its lengthy
discussion of legal intervention dictum.
45. 375 U.S. at 449.
46. See, e.g., Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1968).
47. The Donaldson decision has been considered dispositive of this issue in
subsequent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Diracles, 439 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1971) ;
United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kyriaco,
326 F. Supp. 1184 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
48. The decisions before Donaldson stated that the line should be drawn at the
indictment stage [United States v. Monsey, 429 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1970)] or after
a criminal prosecution has begun [e.g., Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir.
1966)]. The Donaldson Court held that criminal use of the section 7602 summons
becomes improper after a recommendation for prosecution has been sent to the
Justice Department.
49. The Fifth Circuit had approved the use of the third party section 7602
summons after indictment of the taxpayer. United States v. Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213,
1218 (5th Cir. 1969). Other cases have held that a section 7602 summons may be
used even if the sole purpose is to uncover crime. See, e.g., United States v. Erdner,
422 F.2d 835, 836 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Howfield, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 694, 697
(9th Cir. 1969). In a case construing the Donaldson decision on use of the section
7602 summons in a criminal case, referral of the matter to the Justice Department for
prosecution was held ground to quash the summons. United States v. Kyriaco,
326 F. Supp. 1184 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
50. Of course, if the taxpayer is not permitted to intervene and discover what
information the Government possesses, a showing of abuse of process might be
difficult. See cases cited note 18 supra.
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The Court did not describe the circumstances which would evidence
absence of good faith in the issuance of an administrative summons.
However, in a prior decision, the Supreme Court had discussed what
would constitute a lack of good faith on the part of the issuing agent
so as to render the use of the summons unlawful as an abuse of process.
In United States v. Powell,51 the Court stated:
It is the court's process which is invoked to enforce the adminis-
trative summons and a court may not permit its process to be
abused. Such an abuse would take place if the summons had been
issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or
to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other
purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation. 2
It is arguable, therefore, that the Donaldson Court contemplated that
improper use of the section 7602 summons would encompass more
than the notion that the summons should not be issued to aid a pending
criminal prosecution.5"
The Court recognized that evidence could be illegally obtained
by the use of the section 7602 summons. However, it indicated that
the proper remedy for this abuse was not for the taxpayer to intervene
at the enforcement proceedings but was for him to raise his objections
at any subsequent criminal trial. While the Court implied that evi-
dence acquired improperly would be excluded,54 citing dictum in United
States v. Blue,55 the decision arguably left room for abuse of process
to go unchecked, as it has in the past.
51. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). The Powell Court held that the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue need not show probable cause to suspect fraud in order to issue
a section 7602 summons for records pertaining to years relative to which further
legal action would be barred, absent fraud, by the Code's statute of limitations. The
circuits had required various showings, ranging from a strict probable cause standard
[Lash v. Nighosian, 171 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 185 (1st
Cir. 1959)] to no standard at all. Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148
(5th Cir. 1956). The Powell decision is noted in 63 MIcH. L. REv. 939 (1965), and
38 TEMP. L.Q. 462 (1965).
52. 379 U.S. at 58.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Pritchard, 438 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1971), in which
the court, citing the Powell decision, held that the Commissioner must show that
the records sought through use of the section 7602 summons were not already in
the Government's possession and that such a showing had not been made. See also
Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1968) (Wisdom, J.).
54. The Donaldson Court stated that "the taxpayer, to the extent . . . he may
claim abuse of process, may always assert that .. . claim in due course at its proper
place in any subsequent trial." 400 U.S. at 531.
55. 384 U.S. 251 (1966). "[T]his Court in a number of areas has recognized
or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the
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For instance, in DiPiazza v. United States, 6 the defendants were
convicted of violating gambling and wagering laws by using interstate
telephone lines for gambling operations. Intelligence agents of the IRS
acquired toll records of appellants' telephone calls and other federal
authorities used these records to establish probable cause to search
appellants' homes. A provision of the Communications Act of 1934"7
requires that evidence of crimes involving interstate telephone lines
be acquired by "other lawful authority,""5 but the Court had no diffi-
culty holding that the use of a section 7602 summons was not improper
in that case. The Court's rationale was that civil tax liability theo-
retically could have resulted from the use of the summons, so there
was a conceivable lawful purpose for the search." The dissent pointed
out that civil or criminal tax liability was never an object of the investi-
gation because Revenue agents had never been assigned to the case;
Intelligence Division agents merely used the summons to acquire evi-
dence for use by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. "The record
in these cases establishes," the dissent found, "that Government agents
obtained the evidence which led to Appellants' indictments and con-
victions through an indiscriminate abuse of civil process, the § 7602
summons."
60
Because the appellants in DiPiazza had not been recommended
for prosecution at the time the section 7602 summons was issued, the
Donaldson Court's first rule with regard to improper criminal use of
the section 7602 summons was not violated. Indeed, the DiPiazza
Court relied upon a rule similar to the one later enunciated by the
Donaldson Court.6 ' The section 7602 summons, however, was clearly
not designed to provide the basis for probable cause in investigations
by the FBI. While Boren v. Tucker,62 justifiably permitted use of
the summons in a civil investigation which could have led to criminal
liability, the justification disappears when civil or criminal income tax
liability is not even arguably the basis for issuance of the summons.0 8
accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes or federal rules of procedure."
Id. at 255.
56. 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969).
57. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
59. The court of appeals reported that the district court had rejected the
appellants' claim of abuse of process at the hearing on a motion to suppress. 415
F.2d at 107.
60. 415 F.2d at 108 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
61. The DiPiazza court stated: "Where the investigation may produce both civil
and criminal evidence, the summons under section 7602 is a proper device for
obtaining records." Id. at 103.
62. 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956). See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
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It seems clear that the result in DiPiazza has been repudiated by im-
plication through the Donaldson Court's requirement that the section
7602 summons be issued in "good faith." Moreover, the Court specif-
ically addressed itself to the definition of "tax" in delineating the scope
of the section's coverage. 64  The section 7602 summons, therefore,
should never be issued except in connection with actual civil or criminal
tax investigations. Still unsettling in light of DiPiazza is the possibility
that barely colorable tax liability will be sufficient to permit the issuance
of the summons. If the case is interpreted in this way, the exclusionary
rule implied in Donaldson will not be effective in preventing abuse
of process in taxpayer investigations.
CONCLUSION
Although the Donaldson decision firmly rejected the argument
that the section 7602 summons may not be issued in aid of a criminal
investigation prior to a recommendation for prosecution, taxpayers
have continued to assert the objection in efforts to intervene at enforce-
ment proceedings.6" The decision on that point was clearly correct and
the objection has been properly rejected by the cases decided since the
Donaldson decision.6  However, because the Supreme Court inter-
preted rule 81 (a) (3) and rule 24(a) (2) in a way which will drastically
reduce taxpayer intervention at summary enforcement proceedings, it
will be necessary for the district courts to lend a sympathetic ear to a
taxpayer alleging abuse of process either at the enforcement proceeding
or at a subsequent trial for fraud. Having lost one remedy against
overzealous use of the administrative summons by Internal Revenue
Service agents, taxpayers should not be deprived of another.
64. The Court made frequent references to the fact that the section 7602 summons
is to be used only in tax investigations. It also quoted INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 7601
[" 'to proceed ... and inquire after and concerning' all persons 'who may be liable
to pay any internal revenue tax,'" 400 U.S. at 523] ; § 7602 ["Section 7602 authorizes
the Secretary or his delegate for 'the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any
return ...determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax
or collecting any such liability ... [t]o summon the person liable for tax ..
400 U.S. 524]; and cited the Treasury Regulations and the Code section which
define "tax." In reference to the duties of Intelligence agents, who investigate fraud,
the Court quoted the language of Internal Revenue Service Organization and
Functions § 1112 et seq., 35 Fed. Reg. 2417 et seq. (1970), which provides that the
Intelligence Division shall develop programs for the investigation of tax frauds and
"certain other civil and alleged criminal violations of tax laws." Id. at § 1114(10),
quoted ius 400 U.S. at 534.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Schoeberlein, Misc. No. 709-T (D. Md., filed
Nov. 3, 1971).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Diracles, 439 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Kyriaco, 326 F. Supp.
1184 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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